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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

ACCEPTANCE OF OFFERS FOR UNILATERAL CONTRACTS BY PARTIAL PERFORMANCE
OF SERVICE REQUESTED
By

HMENRY

W.

BALLANTINE*

O

NE of the most interesting conundrums in the elementary
theory of contract law relates to the revocability of proposals which call for acts requiring time for completion, once
performance has been entered upon by the offeree. Does part
performance bind the offeror? May the offeror still revoke his
offer, and will it lapse in case of his death before completion?
Take the following case as raising the issues involved. A by
writing purports to give B the exclusive sale on certain terms
for three months from date, of Blackacre owned by A, and
promises to pay him a commission of five per cent in case he
procures a purchaser, or in case A finds a purchaser himself. B
proceeds to perform services in pursuance of this authorization
by listing and advertising the property and endeavoring to sell
it. Thereafter A personally sells and conveys the property, but
refuses to" pay B a commission. He contends that the writing
is on its face unilateral, and that it contains no engagement or
promise on B's part to do any act, and hence is not binding on
either party.
The case of Stensgaardv. Smith' seems to hold that the broker
would have no claim under such an authorization. But Lapham
v. Flint2 in effect overrules the earlier case, and holds that the
offer of a unilateral contract may be accepted by the agent's partial performance and that the owner is liable. The court purports to distinguish the Stensgaard case but on untenable grounds.
That case might perhaps have been distinguished on the construction of the writing, in that it called for an agreement or
promise to act as agent for sale on the part of Stensgaard, and
there was no showing of notification to defendant that he had
undertaken to sell the land.8 The court, however, construed the
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1 (1890) 43 Minn. 11, 44 N. W. 660.
2 (1902) 86 Minn. 376, 90 N. W. 788.

3White v. Corlies, (1871) 26 N. Y. 467.
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offer as giving the broker power either to convert it into a complete bilateral contract by a promise to act as 'agent, or to act
upon it as an offer of a unilateral contract that if the plaintiff
would sell the land, he would receive the stated compensation.
As such an authorization or offer it remained revocable by
defendant, and the fact that for a day or a month he availed
himself of the authority to sell conferred by defendant, by attempting to make a sale, does not constitute an acceptance so as
to bind defendant for the three months' exclusive agency. This
is placed on the ground that he might have discontinued his efforts
to sell without rendering himself liable in damages. It is argued
that there was thus no completed contract and the offer remained
a mere authorization to sell, revocable by the owner.
On this point, however, the case is now in effect overruled,
and Minnesota law is brought into line with the general trend
of the authorities, that if an agent proceeds in good faith to
comply with the proposal for a unilateral contract, and spends
time, money and effort in prosecution of the employment to find
a purchaser, a contract is at once formed, although the compensation is not earned until the conditions have been fully complied
with.4 The obligation which arises in such a case is unilateral,
not bilateral. The agent is under no duty to continue his efforts
but the owner is bound to allow him a reasonable opportunity
to do so. Is this result justifiable on legal principle?
Professor Williston says :5
"To deny the offeror the right to revoke is therefore, in
effect to hold the promise of one contracting party binding,
though the other is neither bound to perform nor has actually
performed the requested consideration."
Thus if A offers B $100 if B will complete a piece of work,
(e. g., build a coach or saw a cord of wood) and B sets about
the work and nearly finishes it, it is a hardship upon B, if, while
the work is still incomplete, A may revoke his offer. Yet, says
Professor Williston,6 "any other result involves either a violation
'Peterson v. Hall, (1895) 61 Minn. 268, 63 N. W. 733; Cloe v. Rogers,
(1912) 31 Okla. 255, 121 Pac. 201, 39 L. R. A. (N.S.) 266; Schoenmann
v. Whitt, (1908) 136 Wis. 332, 9 L. R. A. (N.S.) 598 note; Goward v.
Waters, (1868) 98 Mass. 596, Braniff v. Bajer, (1917) 101 Kan. 117, 165
Pac. 816, 28 Yale Law Journal 575.
5Williston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts 3rd ed. 311, 339. See also
2 Mechem, Agency secs. 2450-2455.
6 1 Williston's Contracts Sec. 60.
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of recognized principles or the invention of new ones." So, he
concludes:
"It seems impossible on theory successfully to question the
power (right?) of one who offers to enter into a unilateral contract to withdraw his offer at any time until performance has
been completed by the offeree, though obvious injustice may
arise in such a case."
There is apparently something radically wrong with the legal
theory which is unable to deal with so simple a situation and
impotently acquiesces in obvious injustice. If recognized theories
or principles do not achieve substantial justice, so much the worse
for them. There is a plain duty for the law to invent or discover
new ones.
The courts usually cut the knot by finding a bilateral contract, and holding that the beginning of work by B amounts to
an assent binding both A and B. 7 In Mooney v. Daily News
Company it is held that a newspaper after making and publishing
rules governing a prize contest for new subscriptions can not
change the rules during the contest. The court speaks as if a
contract were made between the newspaper and the individual
contestants, by which the defendant was bound to abide by the
rules under which they entered on the contest. After part performance by rendition of services the offer became an executory
contract between the person making and the person so partially
accepting the terms of the offer.
It is hard to see how partial acceptance can make the contract
take on a bilateral character as some courts suggest. It is not
possible, however, for legal theory to recognize a unilateral contract upon a consideration which is partially executory. That is
what the cases in fact do. It is true that an offer must be accepted
according to its terms. But if the offeree assents to the offer
and begins performance on the faith of it, we have all the essential elements of contractual obligation. It is true that the offeree
assumes no obligation by beginning to perform. He may unquestionably stop performance balf-way without liability, unless,
indeed, he has induced the other party to change his position in
reliance on his undertaking. But because completion of per7 Mooney v. Daily News, (1911) 116 Minn. 212, 133 N. W. 574, 37 L.

R. A. (N.S.) 183 note; Plumb v. Campbell, (1888) 129 Ill.
101, 106, 107;

18 N. E. 790. See Branniff v. Baier, (1917) 101 Kan. 117, 165 Pac. 816;
Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, (1902) 135 Cal. 654, 67 Pac. 1086.
8 (1911) 116 Minn. 212, 133 N. W. 573, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.) 183. See
also Wachtel v. Natl. Alf. Journ. Co. (Iowa 1920) 176 N. W. 801.
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formance is still optional with the offeree it does not follow that
the proposer may not be bound. He has not yet, it is true,
actually received the full consideration requested. But that is
always true of executory consideration in bilateral contracts. It
is not even true in bilateral contracts that both parties must
always come under legal obligation." It is sufficient "consideration" or ground of enforcement of defendant's promise that he
has invited action by the offeree in reliance on the offer. The
first substantial act is all that need be required in the way of
10
performance to found the defendant's obligation.
The fundamental policy of the law of contracts is to enforce
the demands of good faith in business dealings. Where a proposal calls for acts requiring time for their completion good faith
demands that the proposal become binding when performance
is begun, at least until the offeree has had a reasonable opportunity
to complete what he has undertaken. It is certainly not contemplated by the parties that the offer should be revoked in the
midst of performance; the injustice of that is at once felt. The
suggestion has been made to protect the offeree, that there is an
implied or tacit promise contained in such an offer to hold it
open for a reasonable time in consideration of the beginning of
performance by the offeree. 11 This theory reaches a just and
desirable result, but seems needlessly complex and artificial. It
makes two contracts grow where only one is intended. To hold
the offer "irrevocable" is the same in effect as to hold the promise
binding. The law imposes the obligation precluding the offeror
from arbitrarily revoking the offer, after inducing a person to
act on the faith of it, because this is demanded by good faith
a collateral conand common honesty. It does not depend upon
12
tract or a tacit promise to hold the offer open.
9 See Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 121;
Lawler v. Dunn, (Minn. 1920) 176 N. W. 989. "Nothing is more fun-

damental" than this specious axiom except when it is not true.
10 y. M. C. A. v. Estill, (1913) 140 Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075, 48 L. R. A.

(N.S.) 783; Brokaw v. McElroy, (1913) 162 Ia. 288, 143 N. W. 1087, 50
L. R. A. (N.S.) 835, 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 308, 310; Albert Lea College v.
Brown, (1903) 88 Minn. 524, 529, 93 N. W. 672. (Note given as subscription to college endowment fund. Action in reliance thereon supports the promise.)

Martin v. Meles, (1901)

179 Mass. 114, 60 N. E.

397; Welch v. Lawson, (1856) 32 Miss. 170, 177, 66 Am. Dec. 606.
11 McGovney, Irrevocable Offers, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 644, 645; I Wisc.
Law Rev. 57; 1 Page, Contracts, sec. 130 (194, 195).
See 26
12 Zwolenek v. Baker, (1912) 150 Wisc. 517, 137 N. W. 769.
Harv. L. Rev. 274 note. Glover v. Henderson, (1894) 120 Mo. 367, 25
S. W. 175.
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There is no unfairness in thus holding the proposer to a
unilateral obligation.13 He is simply held to the exercise of good
faith where revocation would result in cheating one who was
rendering him services at his request. He is protected by the
doctrine of implied conditions against having to pay until he
receives the full consideration. If the offeree fails to perform
with due diligence this would terminate the contract just as a
breach would excuse a party to a bilateral contract. A countermand would likewise require cessation of work; but B would
recover both the reasonable value of what he had already done
and also the loss of profit he would have made. If the compensation were contingent on success, as in an offer of reward, the
plaintiff would have to show that he was within reach of success,
when defendant- revoked the offer and denied him the chance
14
to complete.

Professor Williston certainly has the courage of his convictions and declares that even a refusal of tendered performance
will prevent the formation of a unilateral contract. Suppose A
offers to buy goods for cash, to be delivered by the seller B. If
A refuses to accept a tender of the goods is he not liable in
damages to B? Professor Williston, in his authoritative new
treatise on contracts, says, no.' 5 There must surely be some
weakness in the legal logic or the premises which produce this
monstrous result, this reductio ad absurdum. Where the offer
calls for actual performance as consideration, what is the nature
of the contract arising from mere tender? The offeror has as
yet received no consideration, Williston argues. But the offeree
has incurred detriment at his request, and that is sufficient ground
to make the promise binding. The fact that the offeror does
not receive benefit is his own fault. 16
There is no reason why a "uni-promissory" contract should
not arise as soon as detriment is incurred by beginning to perform
the acts which the offeror has requested. The duty to perform
13 See Corbin, 26 Yale L. J. 196.
14Wachtel v. National Alfalfa Journal Co., (Iowa 1920) 176 N. W.
801.

'5

I Williston, Contracts sec. 60b.

"I Brankenburg v. Hodgkin, (1917) 116 Me. 399, 102 Atl. 106; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Goodnight, (1874) 10 Bush (Ky.) 552, 19 Am. Rep.
80. "If the party to whom such an offer is made acts upon it in the
manner contemplated, either to the advantage of the offeror or to his own
disadvantage, such action makes the contract complete." Knowlton, J., in
First National Bank v. Watkins, (1891) 154 Mass. 385, 387, 28 N. E. 275.
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is subject as in a bilateral contract to an implied condition of
performance of the executory part of the consideration. A distinction may thus be drawn between the time when the unilateral
contract arises and the time when the duty of performance or
payment becomes operative. A's proposal does not say when
it shall become binding, but only when payment shall be made.
It is for the law to recognize an obligation as arising from a
promise as soon as justice requires. "Consideration" may be
found even though the acts or services requested have not been
fully rendered. Partial performance and change of position in
reliance on the offer may be sufficient to make the proposal binding. It is better to call this a unilateral contract than an irrevocable offer. A unilateral contract is thus not necessarily a contract which is fully executed on one side. It is a uni-promissory
or uni-obligational contract of which the consideration may be
partly executory and partly executed.

